Written by George A. Miller, 1969.
Miller, G. A. (1969). Psychology as a means of promoting human welfare. American Psychologist, 24(12), 1063–1075. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0028988
THE most urgent problems of our world today are the problems we have made for ourselves. They have not been caused by some heedless or malicious inanimate Nature, nor have they been imposed on us as punishment by the will of God. They are human problems whose solutions will require us to change our behavior and our social institutions.
As a science directly concerned with behavioral and social processes, psychology might be expected to provide intellectual leadership in the search for new and better personal and social arrangements. In fact, however, we psychologists have contributed relatively little of real importance -even less than our rather modest understanding of behavior might justify. We should have contributed more; although our scientific base for valid contributions is far from comprehensive, certainly more is known than has been used intelligently.
This is the social challenge that psychologists face. In the years immediately ahead we must not only extend and deepen our understanding of mental and behavioral phenomena, but we must somehow incorporate our hard-won knowledge more effectively into the vast social changes that we all know are coming. It is both important and appropriate for us, on occasions such as this, to consider how best to meet this social challenge.
In opening such a discussion, however, we should keep clearly in mind that society has not commissioned us to cure its ills; a challenge is not a mandate. Moreover, there is nothing in the definition of psychology that dedicates our science to the solution of social problems. Our inability to solve the pressing problems of the day cannot be interpreted as an indictment of the scientific validity of our psychological theories. As scientists we are obliged to communicate what we know, but we have no special obligation to solve social problems.
Our obligations as citizens, however, are considerably broader than our obligations as scientists. When psychological issues are raised in this broader context, we cannot evade them by complaining that they are unscientific. If we have something of practical value to contribute, we should make every effort to insure that it is implemented.
I believe that the majority of American psychologists have accepted this broader interpretation of our responsibilities and have been eagerperhaps, sometimes, overly eager-to apply our science to social problems. We have not been aloof or insensitive; the bulk of our profession works full time on exactly such problems. And I do not wish to discount the many and often successful efforts toward application that we have made already. Yet I cannot escape the impression that we have been less effective than we might have been. "Why" and "what more might be done" are questions that have troubled me increasingly in recent years.
First, however, I would like to raise a somewhat parochial question.
If we accept this challenge to use psychology to solve social problems, what role should we expect the American Psychological Association to play? I raise this question because my experience as an officer of APA has taught me that many of our members look to their national organization for leadership in insuring that our scientific and professional activities have greater social relevance.
Psychologists have been well represented among those who sign petitions of political protest (Ladd, 1969), and they have not failed to make their opinions heard in their own national headquarters. Scarcely a meeting of the Board of Directors in recent years has not featured one or more petitions from concerned members, committees, boards, divisions, or state associations requesting some action related to public affairs. These matters range all the way from the proper use of psychological tests, where APA usually has something to say, to the endorsement of particular political candidates, where APA usually does not.
These demands have imposed considerable strain on the Association, which was not created to be an instrument for social action and which responds hesitantly to any suggestion that it should become something more than a scientific and professional organization. But it does respond. I was surprised to discover how seriously Al'A regards any legitimate request from its membership, and how sensitive it is to the social implications of its actions, policies, and communications. Some members wish APA would do more, some less. On balance, I think APA has reflected reasonably accurately the general consensus of its members with respect to its role in public affairs.
It is not my intention to raise here any of the specific issues of public policy that have concerned the Board of Directors and the Council of Representatives, or even to offer a general formula for deciding what the public role of the APA should be. Procedurally, I am willing to stand on the thoughtful recommendations of the ad hoc Committee on Public Aflairs (Tyler, 1969).
A point of general interest, however, and one that relates more directly to the theme I wish 1o discuss, is the frequently heard argument that APA should take some action or other because the first article of our Bylaws states that the Association shall have as its object to promote human welfare, a goal that is echoed in our statement of the Ethical Standards of Psychologists.
This argument is usually made by those who recommend that APA should publicly advocate some particular social reform. When these recommendations are appropriate, the action is adopted the necessary letters are written, public statements are released to the press, etc. But not every recommendation is acceptable. It has been my impression that the less related the issue is to the scientific and professional interests of our membership, the greater is the likelihood that the promotion of human welfare will be invoked in the course of the discussion.
In most cases this argument has not persuaded me; I have traced my skepticism to two sources.
First, even the most cursory study of welfare economics will show that human welfare has never been operationally defined as a social concept. If there is such a thing as human welfare in the general sense, it must be some kind of weighted average. In difficult cases, where disagreement is most probable, something that advances the welfare of one group may disadvantage another group. The problem is to decide whose welfare we wish to promote. The APA is committed to advancing the welfare of psychologists, of course, but we dare not assume blindly that whatever is good for psychology must always be good for humanity.
Vague appeals to human welfare seldom answer specific questions because we seldom have sufficient information to decide which actions will have the desired result. And even when we do have sufficient wisdom to know in advance which actions will promote human welfare most effectively, we still face the ethical question of whether such actions are morally permissible.